The Advantages of Connecting Penn Station to Grand Central

For anyone interested in really good rail service for greater New York, the Access to the Region’s Core (ARC) Major Investment Study Summary Report is required reading. It describes three major alternatives for increasing trans-Hudson suburban (and intercity) train capacity evaluated under ARC. Unlike the ultimate design that Governor Christie cancelled, all three alternatives as of this 2003 report linked the new tunnels the southern (lower numbered) tracks of New York Penn Station, a feature that the Amtrak Gateway Project retains. The three alternatives are the following, differing on what would happen to the newly added trains after they got to Penn Station:

  • Alternative G, where trains would continue in a new tunnel from Penn Station to Grand Central’s lower level;

  • Alternative P, where trains would either turn around at Penn Station or at tail tracks just east of it; and

  • Alternative S, where trains would continue to Queens in new tunnels.

ARC MIS Summary Table 1.png

Notice that Alternative G has the best net operating costs, the greatest increase in passenger revenue, and the greatest diversion in passengers from other modes. Notice also that it has the greatest increase in trans-Hudson passengers and the smallest increase in Penn Station-bound passengers. Herein lies the key: by affording Manhattan-bound riders two center city stations to choose from, it limits outflow at any one, limiting dwells and increasing capacity. This is why 20th century urban rail tunnels have several stations in them. Finally, we notice that Alternative G provides the smallest increase in trans-Hudson trains. It is largely on this basis that the report recommends it not proceed.

ARC MIS Summary Table 2.png

The basis for the discrepancy between high utility (diverted trips) and low additional train capacity is, I contend, explained in the following passage on page 19:

“The projected Metro-North 2020 service plan was used as a basis for future train movements into and out of Grand Central Terminal. This service plan included 11 trains in the AM peak hour arriving at the lower level of Grand Central Terminal. The combined Post-Secaucus Service Plan/Metro-North operating plan was the foundation for simulating train movements between the Secaucus Transfer Station, Penn Station, and Grand Central Terminal.

Detailed physical and operating characteristics of NJ TRANSIT, Amtrak, and Metro-North were used to simulate the functional, fully integrated rail network to be in place by 2020. The capacity analysis determined the maximum number of trains capable of operating in the AM peak hour in the key segments, Secaucus to Penn Station and Penn Station to Grand Central Terminal. The results yielded a conceptual service plan that indicated an increase of 13 additional NJ TRANSIT inbound trains (Secaucus to Penn Station) over the Post-Secaucus Service Plan during the AM peak hour, for an inbound total of 36 trains (34 NJ TRANSIT, two Amtrak) occupying 38 slots. Additional service beyond the 13 would make the entire operation
unreliable.

During the AM peak hour, 20 NJ TRANSIT trains would travel from Penn Station to Grand Central Terminal. Of these, 13 would turn in Grand Central Terminal and head back south to Penn Station and points west. To allow NJ TRANSIT trains to enter Grand Central Terminal, the conceptual service plan requires that nine of the 11 Metro-North trains arriving at the lower level of Grand Central Terminal in the AM peak hour would continue through the new tunnels to Penn Station and thence to either the Twelfth Avenue Yard or the Boonton Yard for storage.
The remaining two Metro-North trains and seven NJ TRANSIT trains would head north from the lower level of Grand Central Terminal in revenue and non-revenue service.

Circulation improvements would be needed at both Penn Station and Grand Central Terminal, the latter having certain landmark preservation considerations, to accommodate incremental pedestrian flows. ”

The key is that use of the Metro-North 2020 service plan implies inefficient practices. Today, Metro-North uses a 3 + 1 strategy on the Park Avenue approach to Grand Central. Under this strategy, three out of four tracks take inbound trains in the morning and outbound trains in the evening. Part of the bottlenecking that makes 3 + 1 operation look attractive stems from the low speed limit in the Grand Central throat. Although most of the switches in the approach are good for 15 mi/h or higher, the railroad slows all trains to 10 mi/h for the last mile to the bumpers. Trimming the time trains spend at the platform from today’s 20+ minutes to a more typical dwell of 10 minutes or less should also simplify matters. Alternative G itself would convert many reversals to through movements, thus helping this problem in its own right. The only remaining, and somewhat legitimate, reason for 3 + 1 operation is to keep Hudson Line trains to the westernmost Park Avenue approach track. A flyover at Melrose would easily fix this; a similar flyover proposed for Newark is estimated at $300 million. This cost, while high compared to the Hitchin flyover along the UK’s East Coast Main Line, amounts to rounding error in what Governor Cuomo seems prepared to spend on Penn South.

Essentially, the Alternative G service plan would export to Grand Central the bad practices used at Penn Station today. During the morning peak hour, thirteen of the twenty trains from New Jersey through Penn Station to Grand Central would turn back at Grand Central. These turnarounds would necessarily introduce delays since opposing trains would have to cross paths. It is way simpler to extend these trains to turn around at outlying terminals like Croton-Harmon, North White Plains, and Stamford. Just eleven Metro-North trains out of a total of 52 would arrive at Grand Central’s lower level from the north; nine of those would continue through Penn Station to New Jersey yards. Running just eleven Metro-North trains each morning peak to Penn Station dramatically underutilizes the connection; two-track lines routinely accommodate two-way train flows of 25 — 30 trains each way.

The key to using Grand Central’s potential is to use tighter turn times, a new flyover, and the Alternative G tunnel itself to switch from 3 + 1 to 2 + 2 operations. This way, two tracks, rather than one, would accommodate Westchester-bound trains in the morning, letting in much more than 7 trains per hour from New Jersey. These New Jersey-Westchester trains would bolster reverse peak service and increase capacity upstream at Penn Station. The same would be true in reverse for trains arriving from Westchester. The Alternative G tunnel would enable two parallel through operations at Penn Station: trains linking the new Hudson tunnels with Grand Central and trains linking New Jersey with Queens using the existing Hudson and East River tunnels.

In the same vein, connecting the highest-numbered tracks at Penn Station via a short tunnel to the Empire Line would create a third through running operation. Trains would be able to use the northern two East River tubes relatively independently from those using the southern ones to link to New Jersey.

The insularity in the New York railroading world oozes through the language in the report. The analysis clearly ignores major pieces of modern train operations. The choice made to turn trains back as soon as possible after reaching Manhattan almost certainly stems from a desire to have each railroad’s trains handled by its own crews. This approach is ridiculous; modern railroads perform crew changes constantly, and systemwide electrification (to eliminate slow, heavy, finicky diesel dual-modes) would allow all the local railroad entities to harmonize their trains. On a Tokyo area train, I personally witnessed at least one driver change through the front window; had the window not been there, I would have had no clue since the station stop took no longer than any other on the journey. I see little reason why similar handoffs cannot be done here in New York.

For those with open minds, the contrast between Alternative G and Penn South shows the folly of using new construction to cement bad practices. Paris, Milan, Tokyo, and many other cities have overcome the challenges of institutional turf to secure for their inhabitants much higher quality rail service than New Yorkers enjoy. Ultimately, we can do the tough, unsexy work of untangling institutional dysfunction too. Will we?